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Under prevailing tort law, an injurer who must choose between
Course of Action A, which creates a risk of 500 (there is a probabil-
ity of .1 that a harm of 5000 will result), and Course of Action B,
which creates a risk of 400 (there is a probability of.] that a harm
of 4000 will result), and who negligently opts for the former will be
held liable for the entire harm of 5000 that materializes. This full
liability forces the injurer to pay damages that are five times higher
than would be necessary to internalize the risk of 100 that his neg-
ligent choice actually creates. This Article argues that tort law
should recognize the Offsetting Risks Principle, under which courts
would take into account the risks decreased by the wrongdoing as a
mitigating liability factor The injurer in our example would thus be
liable for only 1000, which is twenty percent of the harm that actu-
ally materialized. This outcome not only differs from the result
under prevailing tort law but also diverges from that mandated by a
probabilistic recovery principle. Under that principle, if in our ex-
ample, the risks of both Course of Actions A and B relate to the
same victim, the injurer should be liable for 4600.
The failure of tort law to cause injurers to internalize the actual
risks created by their negligence, as illustrated by the example
above, emanates from the law's disregard for the positive external-
ities generated by wrongdoings. In our example, the injurer's
negligent choice creates two opposite effects: one negative (increas-
ing risks by 500) and one positive (decreasing risks by 400).
Because the law imposes liability for the negative effects when
harm materializes but ignores the positive effects, the result is that
the injurer bears liability for risks that far exceed the actual risks
he negligently created.
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The Offsetting Risks Principle is suitable mainly for those cases in
which the injurer must balance the various conflicting interests of
his potential victim. It also applies to cases where the injurer must
balance the interests of the victim against the interests of third par-
ties or society as a whole. This Article focuses on the Offsetting
Risks Principle's potential application in medical malpractice
cases. Adopting the Offsetting Risks Principle in such cases and re-
ducing liability in accordance with offsetting risks would result in a
huge-and desirable-decrease in the damages awarded in medical
malpractice suits. Doctors would then pay for no more than the so-
cial harm actually generated by their negligence, practice less
defensive medicine, and refrain from overinvesting in precaution. But
patients are the main beneficiaries: they would pay less for medical
services and receive improved care in return. The apparent problem
of undercompensation for patients could, and should, be solved out-
side the framework of tort law, either by social insurance or by
private insurance.
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INTRODUCTION
Tort law mandates that injurers bear liability for the harm caused by
their negligence. In conventional law and economics theory, this liability
threatens the potential injurer with the expected harm resulting from his
negligence in order to provide him with an efficient incentive to take precau-
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tions. Liability for either less or more than the harm inflicted by the injurer
leads to underdeterrence or overdeterrence, respectively, and results in inef-
ficient levels of precautions.' Corrective justice theories also justify
imposing liability on a negligent injurer for the harm he causes, based on the
notion that the wrongdoer should rectify the injustice created by his wrong-. 2
doing by way of compensation. Thus, prevailing tort law's mandate of
compensation is consistent with both efficiency and corrective justice con-
siderations.
Negligence law is built around the paradigmatic case where the injurer's
precautions reduce the expected harm to potential victims and generate no
adverse effects, either for the victim or for third parties. In this case, both
efficiency and corrective justice considerations support liability for the en-
tire harm. In many instances, however, this paradigm does not apply.
Frequently, precautions reduce expected harm of one type at the expense of
increasing expected harm of another type, either to the victim or to someone
else. An injurer who fails to take these precautions creates a net risk equal to
the difference between the risks he negligently failed to reduce and the risks
he would have created had he taken the necessary precautions. I call the lat-
ter risks offsetting risks. Although courts take into account such offsetting
risks when they set the standard of care, they ignore these offsetting risks
when awarding damages.3 Corrective justice principles support the current
approach, while efficiency principles challenge it. Example 1 below illus-
trates the presence of offsetting risks.
Example 1: Doctor and Patient. A doctor must decide what treatment to
pursue for his patient: Treatment A or Treatment B.4 Each treatment creates
different risks but produces the same utility if the risks are not realized.
This utility is much greater than the risks involved. Treatment A entails a
risk to the patient's left arm of 500 (there is a probability of .1 that the
treatment will produce a harm of 5000), and Treatment B entails a risk to
patient's right arm of 400 (there is a probability of 1 that the treatment will
produce a harm of 4000). The risks of Treatments A and B are not corre-
lated: the realization of the risk from one treatment has no bearing on the
probability of the realization of the risk from the other treatment. The doc-
tor negligently chooses Treatment A, and a harm of 5000 materializes.
Should the negligent doctor's liability be 5000, or should it be a different
amount?5
1. See infra Part IV.
2. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3-21 (1995).
3. In other cases, courts wrongly ignore the injurer's self-risk when they set the standard of
care. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law
and Economics in Coflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000). This mistake was corrected in a recent
draft of the Third Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 3 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
4. Note that one of the treatments could be an omission, such as not operating on the patient
or not administering a certain medicine.
5. For actual cases illustrated by Example 1, see Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560
(9th Cir. 1990), where a doctor chose one asthma drug over a more conservative drug with lesser
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Under prevailing tort law, the doctor's liability in Example I would
amount to 5000. The potentially negligent doctor bears a liability risk of 500
(.1 x 5000) if he makes the wrong choice. Yet the net risk the doctor creates
when he does make a wrong choice is only 100 (500-400).
In a sharp departure from prevailing tort law, this Article argues that the
extent of the injurer's liability in cases such as Example 1 above should be
determined not only by the harm suffered by the victim but also in light of
the risks reduced by the injurer's wrongdoing. Specifically, the damage
award should be reduced to reflect the true social cost of the injurer's negli-
gent behavior. I refer to this as the Offsetting Risks Principle ("ORP"). In
Example 1, this principle would require that the court award only 1000 in
damages, not 5000. Liability in the former amount would set a liability risk
of 100 (.1 x 1000), which equals the net risk that the doctor would create
with a wrong choice. This outcome not only differs from the result under
prevailing tort law but also diverges from that mandated by a probabilistic
recovery principle. Under that principle, the injurer in Example 1 should be
6liable for 4600 (5000 - .1 x 4000).
The failure of prevailing tort law to cause the doctor to internalize the
net risk created by his negligent choice emanates from its disregard for the
positive externalities that the wrongdoing may generate. The doctor's negli-
gent choice in Example 1 creates two opposite effects: one negative
(increasing risks by 500) and one positive (decreasing risks by 400). Since
the law imposes liability for the negative effects when harm materializes but
ignores the positive effects, the doctor bears liability for risks that are much
higher than the net risks he negligently created.
Failing to take into account the offsetting risks makes the injurer liable
for risks that not only exceed the risks created by his negligence but, more
importantly, risks that are higher than the risks created by his activity. Thus,
in Example 1, liability for 5000 would impose on the doctor liability for a
risk five times greater than the risk he actually created. Such excessive li-
ability results in overdeterrence, which is especially destructive in fields
where offsetting risks are common and lawsuits frequent. Medicine is par-
ticularly illustrative. In the medical field, as this Article will demonstrate,
courts' failure to consider offsetting risks as a mitigating liability factor con-
tributes to the flourishing practice of defensive medicine and overinvestment
in precautions, both of which are detrimental to patients
side effects, and Taylor v. Rajani, No. 256058, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2607 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 2005), where a doctor chose surgery over the less invasive procedure of biopsy.
6. See infra Part II1.
7. For the sake of simplicity, this Article does not discuss cases in which the difference
between the two courses of action emanates not from their risks but from their different expected
utility. For example, let us assume that in Example 1, the risks accompanying the two courses of
action are identical, but there is a difference of 100 between their respective expected utilities. Pre-
sumably, if the doctor were to choose the course of action with the lower expected utility, he would
be considered negligent and his liability would be set to reflect the difference between the two ex-
pected utilities. Under this approach, the doctor's expected liability should be 100. Similarly,
Jennifer Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod have argued that a physician's liability should amount to
the difference between the patient's expected benefit from the optimal treatment and her actual
[Vol. 106:243
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The principal objective of this Article is to illuminate the significance of
offsetting risks in setting tort liability and to identify the distortions pro-
duced when courts systematically ignore these risks. The Article proceeds to
propose a means of correcting these distortions and suggests that legisla-
tures-guided by the actual harm caused to the plaintiff, the risk that was
realized into harm, and the magnitude of the offsetting risks-should offer
courts a menu of damages from which they can choose. Part I introduces the
Offsetting Risks Principle and sets its parameters. Part II applies the ORP to
various cases, including those in which the offsetting risks relate to third
parties or to society at large. Part III discusses the relationship between the
ORP and the probabilistic recovery principle. Part IV elaborates on the
drawbacks of-excessive liability when offsetting risks are ignored. Part V
addresses some criticisms of and objections to considering offsetting risks.
The Article concludes by proposing a means by which courts might apply
the ORP.
I. INTRODUCING THE OFFSETTING RISKS PRINCIPLE
Often, a wrongdoer's act both harms and benefits his victim. Courts
regularly take both these effects into account and award damages to the vic-
tim in the amount of the difference between the two. In implementing this
rule, commonly known as the "offsetting benefits rule,"8 courts are adhering
to the restitutio ad integrum principle, under which tort liability should re-
store the victim to the position she would have occupied had she not been
harmed by the wrongdoer. At the same time, the offsetting benefits rule
makes the wrongdoer liable for the net, rather than gross, harm he created,
as required under both efficiency and corrective justice theories.
Similarly, when the wrongdoer inflicts harm on someone and it can be
proven that, had the wrong not been committed, the victim would have suf-
fered some other harm, the wrongdoer is liable for the difference between
the two harms and not for the entire harm that actually materialized.9 To
illustrate this last point, let us modify Example 1 so that there is a probabil-
ity of 1 that Treatment A will cause a harm of 5000 and that Treatment B
will cause a harm of 4000. Clearly, if the doctor chooses Treatment A,
which then results in a harm of 5000, he will be liable to the patient for
1000 and not 5000. This is a simple application of the factual causation test,
known as the but-for test, under which a harm is causally related to an act if
that harm would not have materialized but for the act in question.'°
benefit from the erroneous treatment that she received. Assuming underenforcement, that difference
should be divided by the probability that the doctor is found liable when negligent. See Jennifer
Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organiza-
tions, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1984-85 (2003).
8. This rule has some exceptions, the most important and prevalent of which precludes the
deduction of insurance benefits from damages. For the rule and its exceptions, see I DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8, at 372-79 (2d ed. 1993).
9. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 249-53 (2d ed. 1985).
10. See id. at 109-29.
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Yet in the original version of Example 1, the court would award damages
of 5000 under prevailing tort law, five times higher than what would be neces-
sary in order for the doctor to internalize the true risk produced by his wrong
choice. The question, then, is whether there is any substantive difference be-
tween Example I and its modified version, where the probability of the
occurrence of the harm increases from. 1 to 1. From an efficiency perspective,
the two cases should produce identical outcomes, with liability set at 1000 in
both. Prevailing tort law works otherwise. In Example 1, the doctor's negli-
gence causes harm in the amount of 5000: "but for" his negligence, the doctor
would have chosen Treatment B, which, in ninety percent of the cases, would
have resulted in no harm to the patient. Therefore, by simple application of the
burden of proof requirement, the court should ignore the ten percent probabil-
ity that Treatment B would have produced harm of 4000 and award damages
for the entire harm actually suffered by the patient.
To understand the problematic nature of tort law's treatment of the sce-
nario presented in Example 1, let us imagine that the scenario is repeated ten
times in a row. In all ten cases, the doctor negligently chooses Treatment A
over Treatment B. On average, the total harm caused by these ten wrong
choices is 1000: in one out of the ten cases, the doctor inflicts on one of his
patients harm of 5000, but in another one out of the same ten cases, he saves
a patient from harm of 4000. Yet prevailing tort law will impose liability for
the harm of 5000 suffered by the one patient and will give no credit for the
harm of 4000 from which the other patient was saved. Thus the law causes
the doctor to internalize the negative effects of his negligence but, at the
same time, externalizes its positive effects. As a consequence, the doctor is
held liable for damages in an amount that is five times higher than the actual
harm he negligently caused.
Corrective justice theories offer a plausible response to this quandary:
each tort case should be considered separately as a discrete interaction. Any
grouping together of similar cases as suggested above would be inconsistent
with the fundamental notions of tort law." Rather than directly addressing
this critical argument, I will demonstrate in the paragraphs to follow that the
courts take into account as mitigating liability factors not only harms that
would have been inflicted but for the wrongdoing in question, but also some
of the risks that would have been created but for that wrongdoing. These
risks are not of the same type as the offsetting risks illustrated in Example 1,
but it is hard to find a normatively sound argument to explain why the for-
mer risks should be considered a mitigating factor while the latter are
completely ignored.
Example 2 below, although similar to Example 1, has one important
variation: whereas in Example 1 each treatment entails completely different
risks (nonoverlapping risks), in Example 2 the risks entailed by Treatment A
include the risks of Treatment B (overlapping risks) as well as an additional,
separate risk.
11. See WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 63-66.
[Vol. 106:243
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Example 2: Doctor and Patient-Overlapping Risks. A doctor must de-
cide what treatment to pursue for his patient: Treatment A or Treatment B.
Each treatment entails different risks but produces the same utility if the
risks are not realized. This utility is much greater than the risks involved.
Treatment A entails a risk to five of the patient's fingers of 500 (there is a
probability of . I that the treatment will produce a harm of 5000), and
Treatment B entails a risk to the patient's first four fingers in the amount of
400 (there is a probability of . that the treatment will produce a harm of
4000). The risks of Treatments A and B are not correlated: the realization
of the risk from one treatment has no bearing on the probability of the re-
alization of the risk from the other treatment. The doctor negligently
chooses Treatment A, and a harm of 5000 materializes. Should the negli-
gent doctor's liability be 5000, or should it be a different amount? 2
If we apply prevailing tort law logic to Example 2 and ignore the offset-
ting risks, the outcome should be identical to Example 1. The doctor is
liable for 5000 for the following reason: the doctor's negligence caused the
patient a harm of 5000. If the doctor had behaved reasonably and chosen
Treatment B, the probability that the patient would not have suffered any
harm would have been .9 (recall that the risks of A and B are not correlated).
Therefore, the court should presumably ignore the low probability that, but
for the doctor's negligence, a harm of 4000 would have materialized.
Yet tort law would in fact respond differently to Example 2. Causation
principles mandate that liability be imposed only for the fifth finger that was
negligently exposed to risk and not for the other four fingers that would
have been exposed to the same risk during either treatment. The fact that all
five fingers would very likely have been saved had the doctor chosen to ad-
minister Treatment B is considered completely irrelevant in setting liability.
The reason for this is that under prevailing tort law, the fact that the wrong-
doing in question was a but-for cause of the harm is not sufficient to
establish a causal relationship between the act and the harm that actually
materialized. Rather, the wrongdoing must also satisfy the causal link condi-
tion: its recurrence must increase the chances that the injury will occur.'3
One illustration of this condition is the case of a driver traveling at speeds
above the posted limit who crosses a bridge that collapses for reasons unre-
lated to the speeding. A passenger in the car who is harmed in the accident
brings a tort suit against the driver. It is obvious that the driver will not be
found liable, irrespective of his negligent driving. Even though the driver's
negligence is a but-for cause of the harm (had he been driving more slowly,
he would not have reached the bridge when it collapsed, and the passenger
would have suffered no harm), it does not satisfy the causal link condition:
12. Similarly, in the case of Steele v. Ft. Sanders Anesthesia Group, 897 S.W.2d 270, 273
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), operating on a patient while he was seated added the risk of ischemic injury
to the regular risks of anesthesia and thus the risk of quadriplegia to the normal risk of partial pa-
ralysis. As I explain in the text that follows, had the regular risks been realized, liability under
prevailing tort law should not have been imposed.
13. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 71 (1975).
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speeding per se does not increase the risk of being harmed by collapsing
bridges. 14
In Example 2, the negligent choice of the doctor did not increase the risk
to the first four fingers, only to the fifth finger. The choice can thus be char-
acterized as a cause only with respect to the harm of 1000 that occurred to
the fifth finger. Liability for the harm of 1000 makes a lot of sense: the doc-
tor in no way created a risk of 500 when he wrongly chose Treatment A over
Treatment B. He created a risk of only 100, and liability of 1000 would en-
sure he internalized no less, but also no more, than the true risk his
negligence created."
The same rationale applies to Example 1. Like the doctor in Example 2,
the doctor in Example I by no means created a risk of 500 when he wrongly
chose Treatment A over Treatment B. Moreover, no more than a risk of 100
can be attributed to his act, wrongful or not, because even absent any act on
the part of the doctor, the patient would have been exposed to a risk of at
least 400. The fact that the risks of the two courses of treatment overlap in
Example 2 but do not in Example 1 should not change the outcome. In both
cases there is a risk of 400 unrelated to the doctor's negligence or even to
his actions, and he should not be held responsible for the realization of that
unrelated risk.
While Examples 1 and 2 represent pure nonoverlapping risks and pure
overlapping risks, respectively, there are scenarios that fall between these
two extremes to which the ORP should be applied as well. This is the case
when the risks associated with the negligent and nonnegligent choices relate
to the same object, say, the patient's right arm, but either the magnitude of
the harm if the risks are realized or the probability of the harm materializing
14. Cf HART & HONOR , supra note 9, at 121-22 (discussing when speeding is causally
connected to an accident). Similarly, in a case where a tree fell on a car as it was speeding, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania held that the causal relationship between the accident and the
defendant's speeding was insufficient for the imposition of liability:
That his speed brought him to the place of the accident at the moment of the accident was the
merest chance, and a thing which no foresight could have predicted. The same thing might as
readily have happened to a car running slowly, or it might have been that a high speed alone
would have carried him beyond the tree to a place of safety.
Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240, 240 (Pa. 1899).
15. In a decision rendered by the British House of Lords, Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL
41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134 (appeal taken from Eng.), the majority of the Lords decided to depart from
established causation principles. The plaintiff had undergone an operation that had failed and re-
sulted in harm. Id. at [II], I A.C. at 142. She could not prove that the doctors had been negligent in
executing the operation. Id. The plaintiff was able to prove, however, that she had not been fully
warned of the risks of the operation by her doctors, and so her consent could not be deemed in-
formed. Id. at [51, 1 A.C. at 140. To establish the doctors' liability for her injury, it was necessary for
the plaintiff to show that but for the lack of due warning, the harm would not have occurred. Id. at
[29], 1 A.C. at 147. The Court held for the plaintiff, reasoning that the plaintiff would have asked for
a second opinion had she been adequately warned by her doctors. Id. at [II], I A.C. at 142. The
second opinion would have recommended the same operation, but it would have delayed the proce-
dure by a few days, at which point the plaintiff would have probably undergone the operation
without suffering any harm. Id. The minority, in holding for the defendants, reasoned that the lack of
due warning had not increased the risks to the plaintiff, even though it had constituted a but-for
cause of the harm. Id. at [7]-[10], 1 A.C. at 141-42.
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vary between the two choices. To illustrate, suppose that Treatment A cre-
ates a risk of 500 (there is a probability of .1 that a harm of 5000 to the right
arm will materialize), while Treatment B creates a risk of 400 (there is a
probability of .08 that the same harm will materialize). The ORP mandates
that if the doctor negligently chooses Treatment A and a harm of 5000 mate-
rializes, liability should be in the amount of 1000-not 5000. A liability of
1000 is the extent of the liability necessary for the doctor to internalize the
net risk of 100 that he created with his negligent choice of Treatment A.
When there is no correlation between the risks associated with each
choice, however, courts will impose liability for the entire harm sustained by
the patient. I suspect that courts base such decisions on the fact that but for
the doctor's negligent choice, it was more likely than not that the patient
would have suffered no harm whatsoever. More precisely, the probability
that he would have suffered harm is only .08 and therefore can be ignored.1
6
To sum up, when the same wrongful act that increased the risk that even-
tually was realized (rA) reduced another risk (r,), liability (L) should be
equal to the harm that materialized (hA) multiplied by the difference between
the two risks (ra-rB) and divided by the risk that was realized. This can be
expressed in the following formula:
L= hA rA - rB 17
rA
If we apply this formula to Example 1, the doctor would have to bear li-
ability only in the amount of 1000 for the harm created by his negligent act:
L = 5000 x (500 - 400) / 500
Note that either rA or r8 could be the result of omission. Also note that
when the injurer could have chosen among more than two options, r" should
16. The outcome under prevailing tort law would be different, however, if we were to assume
instead that the risks entailed by the treatments are correlated. Ruling out the noncorrelation as-
sumption would yield the following threefold factual argument: (a) Treatment A would harm 10 out
of 100 patients exposed to this course of treatment, (b) Treatment B would harm 8 out of 100 pa-
tients exposed to the treatment, and, most importantly, (c) the same 8 people who would have
suffered harm under Treatment B would have suffered identically under Treatment A. Under this
argument, the probability that the doctor's negligent choice caused the patient's harm is only twenty
percent. Courts applying a preponderance of the evidence standard would dismiss the action against
the doctor, while courts applying the probabilistic recovery principle would award damages for only
twenty percent of the patient's harm.
17. A different way to present the same idea is as follows:
L-=- PAhAP B =hA 1 hPBhB
P~hA PAh A
Here L denotes liability, hA denotes the harm that materialized from rA, PA denotes the ex ante prob-
ability that rA will be realized into h., h. denotes the harm that could have materialized from r., and
P. denotes the ex ante probability that r. would have been realized into h.
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be the risk entailed by the most reasonable option among the various alter-
natives available to the injurer.
II. THE OFFSETTING RISKS PRINCIPLE IN ACTION
As noted, in many instances increasing one risk to the victim entails de-
creasing another risk to her. Example 1 above is representative of this
scenario. In other instances, however, an increase in the risk to the victim
brings with it a decrease in risks to third parties or to society in general. The
ORP is applicable in all these categories of cases: the negligent injurer who
failed to decrease a risk that eventually was realized into a harm should be
held liable only for the fraction of the harm that reflects the net risk created
by the wrongdoing. The net risk is the difference between the risk that was
increased and the risk that was decreased by the same act or omission.
5
This Part will discuss these categories of cases as they are manifested in
the case law. In these categories, the injurer, ex ante, must balance one set of
the victim's interests either against another set of her interests, against third-
party interests, or against societal interests.'9 In all three categories, the neg-
ligent failure to secure the victim's interests, which in turn materialized into
a harm to the victim, is accompanied by a decrease in the risk to others' in-
terests. To the best of my knowledge, the ORP was not adopted-or even
raised-in any of the following cases.
A. The Different Interests of the Victim
Example 1 illustrates the first category of cases, where the injurer must
balance conflicting interests of the victim. On the one hand, the patient has
an interest in the bodily integrity of her left arm, and on the other hand, she
has a similar interest in her right arm. Securing one interest will always be at
the expense of the other. At the same time, failing to secure one interest,
even negligently, necessarily decreases the risk to the other. The risk created
by the negligent doctor who made the wrong choice of treatment is therefore
the difference between the risk added to the left arm and the risk eliminated
from the right arm.
This first category encompass more than medical malpractice cases,
even though offsetting risks are common in that field.' ° Lawyers, account-
ants, and other professionals are often required to balance their clients'
conflicting interests. Sometimes they, too, must choose the course of action
18. Cf Stephen Marks, Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainly Theorem, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 287, 288 (1994) ("Increasing the precaution level not only lowers the expected cost of
accidents but also changes the types of accidents that occur and changes the identities of those at
risk.") Marks makes this point to criticize one of Grady's arguments with respect to the optimal
negligence rule, but does not take it further to propose the adoption of the ORP.
19. Cf Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105 (2003)
(presenting the various categories of such instances and arguing that the necessity of imposing li-
ability varies among the categories).
20. For examples of actual cases, see supra note 5.
[Vol. 106:243
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that is least risky for their client, and their negligent failure to properly bal-
ance any conflicting interests could result in harm. Again, if the same
negligence that increased one risk also decreased a separate risk,' then both
risks should be taken into account by courts when awarding damages.
The conflicting interests of a victim are also implicated when a health
authority decides to vaccinate the entire population against a certain disease.
Vaccinating a specific individual could be negligent if that individual's risk
from the vaccine's side effects is higher than the risk of contracting the dis-
ease if not vaccinated. Still, the decision to vaccinate that individual, while
negligently increasing the risk of side effects, decreases the risk of contract-
ing the disease. Applying the ORP would result in lowering the damages
awarded for the materialized harm of the side effects.22
Lastly, consider a rescuer who negligently attempts a rescue and inflicts
harm upon the victim being rescued. For instance, a layman rescuer who
administers first aid to the victim of a road accident leaves the latter with
bodily injury that would not have occurred had the victim received profes-
sional medical treatment only.23 It is possible that the rescuer will be
considered negligent, because he should have waited for a medical team to
arrive and refrained from providing first aid. At the same time, it is possible
that, when the rescuer provided first aid treatment, there was a certain risk
that a medical team would not arrive on time and the victim's state would
deteriorate even further. Even though the rescuer, given the different risks
involved, is considered negligent, he should not be liable for the entire harm
suffered by the victim. Instead, he should be liable only for the fraction of
the harm that reflects the difference between the risk created and the risk
avoided by the negligent rescue attempt. 24
21. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shea, 688 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa. 1997) (affirming lower court
ruling upholding plaintiff's cause of action for malpractice where an attorney advised his client to
settle but failed to explain the consequences of settling); Saetz v. Braun, 116 N.W.2d 628, 632-34
(N.D. 1962) (finding a livestock carrier who chose to cross an unsafe bridge instead of taking a
steeper and longer route negligent and liable for the full amount of harm).
22. At this stage, I ignore the third-party benefits of universal inoculation enjoyed by the
majority of the inoculated population who do not suffer from the vaccine's side effects. Cf Jonathan
Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about Penalties and Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 18 (1993) (arguing that high liability for harms resulting from vaccines
and birth-control devices produces negative incentives to develop them, even though they are bene-
ficial to society). These benefits are third-party offsetting risks. See infra Section II.B.
23. Cf Hebert v. Perkins, 260 So. 2d 15 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (imposing liability for injuries
sustained by his sick passenger on a driver who drove through a red light and collided with another
car while rushing that sick passenger to the hospital.) Needless to say, no offsetting risks were taken
into account in the decision. See Baron & Ritov, supra note 22, at 18.
24. Every state has adopted a Good Samaritan statute that reduces the standard of care for
"licensed health care providers when they are rendering certain professional assistance at the scene
of an emergency accruing outside the professional's regular practice." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS, §252, at 663 (2000). Some states also extend the statute to any person who renders emer-
gency assistance. See id. at 664. The ORP could serve as a possible mean to reduce liability in such
cases at the damages-rather than at the standard of care-level.
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B. The Victim's Interests versus Third-Party Interests
Example 3 below illustrates the application of the ORP when the negli-
gent infliction of harm on the victim entails a decrease in risks to others.
Example 3: The Ambulance Driver. An ambulance driver hits a pedes-
trian with his ambulance while rushing a wounded passenger to the
hospital, causing the pedestrian bodily injury of 5000. Had the driver
slowed down by twenty miles per hour, the accident would have been pre-
vented and the risk to pedestrians and other people using the road would
have decreased by 500. At the same time, slowing down also would have
increased the risk to the wounded passenger by 400. For how much should
the driver be held liable?25
Prevailing negligence law mandates that the driver in Example 3 be held
liable for 5000, which would cause him to internalize a risk of 500 when
rushing his passenger to the hospital, even though the net risk he created
was only 100. Conversely, the ORP requires that liability be imposed for
only 1000.
Sometimes, the negligent act decreases risks to nonspecific third parties.
In one such case, a driver negligently drove too slowly on the highway and
26caused an accident. Driving faster at a reasonable speed would have
decreased the risk of an accident caused by driving too slowly but, at the
same time, would have increased the risk of an accident caused by driving
more quickly. The ORP would require that the liability of the slow driver
reflect the difference between the risk increased and the risk decreased by
negligently driving at a reduced speed. In an analogous example, consider a
safety device for a car that decreases the risk of accidents of one type while
unreasonably increasing the risk of accidents of another type. Both risks are
not necessarily borne by the buyer of the car and could also affect third par-
ties.27 In this scenario, the ORP also mandates reducing the manufacturer's
liability in accordance with the risks reduced to others.
25. Cf Hebert, 260 So. 2d at 17. In Hebert, the court also imposed liability on the rescuing
driver for injuries sustained by the driver of the vehicle with which the rescuing driver collided. No
offsetting risks were considered in this context either.
26. Von Bergen v. Kuykendall, 400 P.2d 553, 554-56 (Or. 1965) (imposing liability on the
slow driver for the full harm inflicted on the victim). A similar example is the negligent failure of the
state to maintain safety on the highway by lighting flares. See Whitehouse Trucking Co. ex rel.
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 22 I11. Ct. Cl. 126, 135 (Ct. Cl. 1955). Lighting flares is known to be
hazardous. See Ott v. Washington Gas Light Co., 205 F. Supp. 815, 817 (D.D.C. 1962) (describing
how a small child was burned by the open flame of a flare pot set out in the street to warn of a barri-
cade protecting an excavation).
27. Cf Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (holding that, in order to
avoid liability for its defective design, a tractor manufacturer should prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of danger
inherent in the design); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding a manufacturer of latex gloves liable for an allergic reaction triggered by exposure to the
cornstarch powder with which it lined its gloves but giving no consideration to the possible benefits
of the addition of cornstarch powder). Another noteworthy case in this context is that of an automo-
bile bumper manufacturer who designed a higher bumper, making it safer for the driver of the car to
which it is attached but more dangerous for other drivers on the road. Beatty v. Trailmaster Prod.,
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This second category of cases also includes professionals who must bal-
ance the interests of their clients against the interests of third parties. In
28Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the police briefly de-
tained a patient who, upon information from his therapist, had intended to
murder his ex-girlfriend, but the police eventually released the patient be-
cause he appeared to be of sound mind. Neither the police nor the therapist
notified the ex-girlfriend of the danger, and eventually she was murdered by
the patient. The California Supreme Court recognized that tort liability
could be imposed on the therapist for his failure to exercise reasonable care
to protect the victim by warning her of the danger posed by the patient. 9 It
further ruled that, in these circumstances, such a warning would not be con-
sidered a breach of medical confidentiality and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Had the trial court applied the ORP, it should have de-
ducted from damages an amount representing the risk to the patient's mental
health that could have been created had the therapist warned the victim. Fur-
thermore, under the ORP, the trial court also could have reduced damages
even further by taking into account the societal interest in medical confiden-
tiality that would have been adversely impacted had the therapist warned the
victim. The next Section will expand upon this question of whether damages
should be reduced when a negligent act simultaneously diminishes a risk to
the interests of society at large.
A similar set of facts emerged in Cooley v. Public Service Co.30 In this
case, a telephone company subscriber sued the telephone company for the
nervous shock he had suffered due to a loud, sudden noise that had ema-
nated from his phone cables and interrupted his phone conversation. It
appeared that had the telephone company taken certain precautions to re-
duce the risk of this occurrence to its subscribers, the risk of electrocution to
bystanders would have increased. The court dismissed the suit, emphasizing
the importance of protecting bystanders even at the expense of protecting
subscribers. Alternatively, the court could have applied the ORP and, while
still imposing liability on the telephone company, reduced damages com-
mensurate with the decrease in the risk to bystanders.3'
Inc., 625 A.2d 1005 (Md. 1993) (holding that the mere fact that the truck's bumper was higher than
that of the decedent's car did not render the truck defective or unreasonably dangerous).
28. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
29. An analogous example is the negligent release of a mental patient who poses a threat to
his family. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322 (D. Kan. 1981), aff'd, 727 F.2d 888
(I0th Cir. 1984).
30. 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940).
31. In a third case, decided by the House of Lords, the police were not held liable for their
failure to hold a person in custody who, after his release, murdered the plaintiffs' relative. The Lords
ruled that the police owed no duty of care in the circumstances under discussion. Hill v. Chief
Constable, [19891 A.C. 53 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). Had the Court imposed liability and
applied the ORP, the liability would have been reduced due to the fact that by releasing the alleged
murderer, the police had eliminated the risk of holding an innocent person in custody.
In yet another case, the House of Lords ruled that a public authority operating a liberal reha-
bilitation camp with less supervision than commonly practiced owed a duty of care to people injured
by inmates who had escaped from custody. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [19701 A.C. 1004
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). Here, too, imposition of liability and application of the ORP would
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Applying the ORP to this second category of cases could be expected to
meet with greater resistance than its application in the first category of
cases. In fact, even when harming the victim prevents certain harm to a third
party, courts tend to impose liability for the entire harm and not allow a de-
duction for the prevented harm. As demonstrated in Part I, the rationale for
such a deduction is quite obvious when the harm caused and the certain
harm prevented (or benefit obtained) accrue to the same person. In such
cases, the factual causation test as well as the offsetting benefit rule mandate
imposing liability for the net, rather than gross, harm incurred. That ration-
ale does not apply when harming the victim prevented harm to a third party.
To illustrate, assume that in Example 1, instead of increasing one risk and
decreasing another risk to the same patient, the doctor negligently caused a
certain harm of 5000 to Patient A instead of causing a certain harm of 4000
to Patient B. To concretize this scenario, assume that the doctor admitted
both Patients A and B to the emergency room, but because he was the only
doctor available, he could treat only one patient at a time. Each patient
would have suffered certain harm without immediate treatment. The doctor
negligently chose to treat Patient B first rather than Patient A. As a result,
Patient A suffered a harm of 5000, but Patient B, due to the doctor's negli-
32gent choice, was saved from a harm of 4000.
Even though the negligent doctor created a net harm of only 1000, under
prevailing tort law he would be obliged to compensate Patient A for 5000
and would not receive any credit for the harm he prevented to Patient B.
Because this is the tort law approach to deducting certain harm that is pre-
vented, it follows that prevented risks do not affect injurers' scope of
liability either. Tort law's disregard for the harm-as well as the risks-
prevented to third parties is rooted in the principle of compensation on the
one hand and the law's approach towards positive externalities on the other.
These rationales create the sharp divide between the first and second catego-
ries of cases when it comes to applying the ORP.
The principle of compensation, which is strongly supported by correc-
tive justice, is the central explanation for why injurers should pay damages
to their victims and not to the state-for why we need tort law in addition to
criminal law.33 Allowing harms or risks prevented to third parties to affect
the amount of damages awarded to victims would undermine the goal of
compensation. Conversely, reducing damages due to the prevention of cer-
tain harm to the victim is a natural reaction on the part of the court, which is
have resulted in a reduction of damages due to prevention of the harm, or risk of harm, the inmates
would have suffered had they been held in a less liberal rehabilitation camp.
32. An analogous example is that of a dam operator who fails to balance the interests of
landowners along the lake created by the dam and landowners below the dam. See, e.g., Trout Brook
Co. v. Willow River Power Co., 267 N.W. 302, 306 (Wis. 1936); Boyington v. Squires, 37 N.W. 227
(Wis. 1888); Hackstack v. Keshena Improvement Co., 29 N.W. 240 (Wis. 1886). None of these
cases imposed liability on the dam operator.
33. Another explanation is that recognizing the entitlement of victims to compensation (as
opposed to the state) provides them with an incentive to bring actions and enforce the law against
transgressors. Absent such entitlement, victims would lack incentive to report the harms they suffer.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10, at 192 (6th ed. 2003).
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required to award damages for the actual harm suffered by the victim. Ad-
mittedly, the justification for reducing damages due to risks-rather than
certain harm-is less obvious, but, as explained in Part I, a rather compel-
ling analogy exists between harms and risks.
The second reason why tort law ignores harms or risks prevented to third
parties is a product of its approach to positive externalities. Subject to a few
recognized exceptions, when a person confers uninvited benefits on another
person, she is generally not entitled to any payment for those benefits. An
efficiency-oriented justification for this general rule is that it encourages
consensual, as opposed to coerced, transactions among parties. 34 Analo-
gously, a wrongdoer who creates benefits for a third party by reducing the
latter's risk of harm should not expect to reap anything from anyone for
those conferred benefits-not from the third party (who is typically uniden-
tified) and certainly not from the victim who received no benefits
whatsoever. Arguably, from a moral perspective as well, it makes no sense
that the victim of the wrongdoing would have to pay-in the form of reduc-
tion in damages-for benefits to third parties that were obtained due to
unreasonably exposing the victim to a risk of harm. How could one convinc-
ingly argue that Patient A, who suffered a harm of 5000 in the last variation
of Example 1, be awarded damages only in the amount of 1000 simply be-
cause Patient B benefited from the doctor's wrongdoing toward Patient A?
To be sure, the rationale for reducing damages to victims in the first
category of cases is also rooted in the positive externalities created by the
wrongdoing. The reason the patient in the original variation of Example I
should receive damages of 1000 is not that she received a benefit of 4000
that should be deducted from her harm of 5000. In fact, in Example 1, the
reason for applying the ORP is because the doctor's wrongdoing sometimes
culminates in saving unidentified patients from a harm of 4000. Thus, as
explained earlier, in ten similar cases, one patient suffers a harm of 5000 but
another patient (who is probably not the victim who suffered the harm of
5000) is saved from a harm of 4000. This is the reason for applying the ORP
to Example 1 and for reducing the victim's damages from 5000 to 1000.
Still, there is a very pronounced distinction between the first category of
cases and the second category, which makes the application of the ORP
much more appealing in the former. In the first category of cases, and in
Example I in particular, the same person-our victim-who was exposed to
an ex ante, unreasonable risk of 500 is also the person who received an ex
ante benefit from the same wrongdoing, in terms of reducing another risk to
her by 400. The victim does not enjoy such a benefit in the second category
of cases, because the ex ante-as well as the ex post-beneficiary of the
wrongdoing is a third party. For this reason, it can be convincingly argued
that 80% of the risk to the victim that is realized in Example 1 (400 out of
500) is not the result of the doctor's wrongdoing, and his liability for the
materialized harm should be set accordingly. Such an argument does not
34. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 68-82 (1985).
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apply to the second category of cases, where 100% of the risk to the victim
that is realized into the ultimate harm is the result of the wrongdoing.
A possible response to the efficiency-oriented argument against applying
the ORP to this second category of cases is that for these cases, the concern
that consensual transactions between injurers and third parties will be dis-
couraged is irrelevant. As long as the goal is efficiency and not
compensation, the wrongdoer should be charged in the exact amount of the
social costs of his wrongdoing, and those costs consist of both harms and
benefits (that is, harms done and harms prevented), either to the victim or to
third parties.35
A related argument against applying the ORP to the second category of
cases is based on the transaction costs of dealing with third-party effects in
general, whether negative or positive. It is often the case that a wrongdoer
creates harms for which no one can sue him and benefits for which he can-
not sue. The law imposes liability for the major harms created and ignores
the rest, because the transaction costs of dealing with small harms are pro-
hibitively high. For the same reason, tort law also ignores positive effects
such as offsetting risks. A possible response to this argument is that the
third-party effects ignored by tort law are typically minimal and random,
whereas in the context under discussion, the prevented harms or risks are
typically substantial, systemic, and central to defining the true social cost of
the wrongdoing.
In sum, tort law does not recognize harms or risks prevented to third
parties as a mitigating factor in awarding damages. This approach is
strongly supported by the goal of compensation, which is associated with
corrective justice, but violates the principle that the wrongdoer should inter-
nalize the true social costs of his wrongdoing, an efficiency-based principle
that many believe to be the foundation of tort law.
C. The Victim's Interests versus Societal Interests
The ORP is also applicable to cases where the injurer must balance the
victim's interests against societal interests, even when the latter cannot be
assigned to any specific individual.
Example 4: The Hike. A tour guide leads a group of hikers through the
Judean Desert and must choose one of two paths: Path A, which crosses
territory where hikers are likely to cause harm to the landscape and envi-
ronment, or Path B, which passes through territory where that particular
harm is not a real risk but where a dangerous trail awaits the hikers instead.
35. Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, Ill YALE L.J. 547, 554 (2001)
("[Tihe efficiency rationale for takings compensation also dictates that the state properly measure
the benefits of its actions. Just as the state's failure to internalize the cost of takings creates fiscal
illusion and inefficiency, the state's failure to internalize the benefit of givings creates fiscal illusion
and inefficiency."). See also Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions
from Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001) (arguing that when a breach of contract or a wrong-
doing triggers nonlegal sanctions that confer benefits on third parties, efficiency requires deducting
those nonlegal sanctions from damages).
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The risk to the landscape and environment entailed by Path A is 400,
whereas the risk to the hikers entailed by Path B is 500. The guide chooses
Path B. One of the hikers falls from a cliff while walking along the path
chosen by the guide and suffers a harm of 5000. Should the guide be liable
for 5000, or should he be liable for some other amount?
Whether the guide was negligent or not rests on whether he properly
balanced the societal value of preserving the landscape and environment
against the risk he created for the hikers by choosing Path B. If the court
were to apply a test based on a cost-benefit analysis, it would conclude that
the guide had been negligent and impose liability on him in the amount of
5000. In contrast, applying the ORP would yield liability in the amount of
1000, causing the guide to internalize the net risk he negligently created.
Potential injurers, including public authorities, must often balance socie-
tal interests against individual interests. Thus a publisher might have to
balance the societal interest in free speech against an individual's interest in
her privacy and reputation.37 Imposing liability on the publisher for libel or
infringement of privacy would result in damages being awarded for the en-
tire harm suffered by the victim. Conversely, applying the ORP would
mandate reducing damages for the preservation of the societal interest in
free speech, which was promoted at the expense of the individual interest in
privacy and reputation. Similarly, a police officer who hit an innocent by-
stander while negligently shooting at robbers in a fleeing car should have
balanced the societal interest in capturing the robbers against the bystanders'
individual interests in their personal security. 3' Applying the ORP would
again yield a reduction in the police officer's liability for the harm suffered
by the bystander.
In practice, when courts award damages, they do not take into account
risks that would have been posed to societal interests had the injurer be-
haved reasonably. Like the effect on third parties, the effect on social
interests is treated as irrelevant to the matter of damages. Moreover, the ar-
gument for reducing damages awarded to individuals because the
infringement of their rights enabled the promotion of societal interests could
seem untenable, not only from a corrective justice perspective, but also from
the standpoint of distributive justice, particularly when asserted by a wrong-
doing public authority.39 The argument for the ORP gains force, however, if
36. One could argue that preserving the landscape and environment is a goal the tour guide
should ignore, since his only task is to ensure the hikers' safety. Under this argument, others (like
the Environmental Protection Agency) should take care of preserving the landscape and environ-
ment. Obviously my stance on this issue is different.
37. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (finding a newspaper liable for invasion of privacy after it published a
picture of the plaintiff without her consent).
38. Heidbreder v. Northampton Twp. Trs., 411 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (imposing
full liability on the police officer).
39. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 258-59 (1996)
(examining the notion of negligence as engaging in an activity in which those who bear the risk of
being harmed are not those who stand a chance of reaping the benefits); Gregory C. Keating, Dis-
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we are serious about the goal of ensuring that the injurer internalizes the
social costs of his negligence. The injurer who has increased a risk to his
victim's interests but at the same time reduced a risk to a societal interest
has created a net risk that amounts to the difference between the increased
risk to the victim and the decreased risk to society at large. His liability
should be set accordingly.
III. OFFSETTING RISKS AND PROBABILISTIC RECOVERIES
The Offsetting Risks Principle as applied to the first category of cases
(where the different interests of the victim must be balanced) bears a super-
ficial resemblance to the probabilistic recovery principle ("PRP"). The PRP
imposes liability on a defendant for the harm suffered by the plaintiff multi-
plied by the probability that the harm was caused by the defendant's
wrongdoing . Some courts apply the PRP in medical malpractice cases
where the doctor's negligence diminished the plaintiff's chances of recov-
ery. To illustrate, consider the case of a patient who arrives at the hospital
with a probability of recovery of .3. Because her condition is not diagnosed
by the doctor in time, her probability of recovery drops to zero. The patient
brings a suit against the doctor. Instead of applying the preponderance of
evidence standard, under which the patient would lose because the probabil-
ity that the doctor caused her harm is less than .5, the court could apply the
PRP, 4' which would result in the doctor bearing liability for thirty percent of
the patient's harm. The main argument in favor of the PRP is that it typically
prevents underdeterrence. In cases where the likelihood of proving a causal
relationship between the harm and the wrongdoing is systematically low,
adhering to the preponderance of the evidence standard will produce under-
deterrence, whereas the PRP will not.42 Occasionally, however, where the
tributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law ofAccidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 196-97 (2000);
Tsachi Keren-Paz, The Limits of Private Law: Tort Law and Distributive Justice 356 (Dec. 2000)
(unpublished D. Jur. dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University) (on file with author)
("The public benefits from the activities of the public authority, and therefore the public should bear
the costs of this activity. When the public authority harms the plaintiff, liability should be imposed,
and the public would ultimately bear the costs of the activity that benefited it and harmed the plain-
tiff.").
40. ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 116-29 (2001).
41. In this context, the principle is known as the "lost chances of recovery principle." See
e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P2d 175 (Kan. 1994) (holding that, in order to recover damages for the
loss of chances for a better recovery, the diminished degree of recovery must be substantial one);
Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56-57 (Mich. 1990), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2912a(2) (1993); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991) (holding
that a 10% probability constitutes a substantial diminished degree of recovery); Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note 8, § 8.1(7),
at 406-11; Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
Some courts have extended the principle to other areas of the law, such as civil rights. See e.g.,
Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (supporting the extension of the lost
chances principle to areas beyond malpractice and instructing the trial court to consider the possibil-
ity of awarding the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit damages calculated according to
the chances that his not being promoted was due to illegal discrimination).
42. See PORAT & STEIN, supra note 40, at 126-29.
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likelihood of proving a causal relationship between the harm and the
wrongdoing is systematically high, the application of the PRP will prevent
overdeterrence.
Thus, a common rationale exists for the PRP and ORP: both aim to
make the injurer internalize the exact magnitude of the risks he wrongfully
creates, no less (typically the function of the PRP) and no more (the func-
tion of the ORP). This is necessary to provide the injurer with efficient
incentives to take precautions and to minimize social costs. Where offsetting
risks are present and the PRP fails to achieve this goal, the ORP succeeds.
The divergence between the ORP and the PRP relates to the different ef-
ficiency flaws that each principle aims to correct. While the PRP seeks to
overcome the uncertainty of the specific case at hand so that liability is set
according to the probability that the particular harm was caused by the par-
ticular wrongdoing, the ORP is motivated by the presence of positive
externalities and by the need to credit the wrongdoer for creating them. To
illustrate the different results under the two principles, consider their appli-
cation to Example 1. Recall that the doctor chose Treatment A, which
entailed a risk of 500, over Treatment B, which entailed a risk of 400. A
harm of 5000 in fact materialized, but there was a probability of 1 that had
the doctor chosen Treatment B, a different harm of 4000 would have materi-
alized. As explained earlier, under the ORP, liability should be set in the
amount of 1000. Under the PRP, however, liability should be in the amount
of 4600. There is a probability of .9 that the defendant caused harm of 5000,
and there is only a probability of .1 that he caused harm of 1000
(5000-4000). Liability should therefore be calculated as:
L =.9x5000+. ×xOOO = 4600 3
The ORP has a much more ambitious objective than just accounting for
the uncertainty of the particular case, which is the aim of the PRP. The ORP,
as applied to Example 1 and the first category of cases, seeks to credit the
injurer for any potential benefit of his wrongdoing that the victim could
have gained due to the wrongdoing regardless of whether she actually
gained it or not." The ORP aims at correcting an efficiency distortion cre-
ated by prevailing tort law, under which the injurer internalizes the negative
effects of his wrongdoing but the positive effects are externalized. Thus in
Example 1, that potential benefit is the possibility that the wrongdoing saved
the victim from a harm of 4000. It is most probable that, in the case at hand,
the victim has not actually gained this benefit at all. In fact, even if it could
be proven that the probability that the doctor's wrongdoing saved the victim
from alternative harm of 4000 is zero, the doctor's liability under the ORP
should still be 1000.
43. Another way to put it is as follows: the expected harm that would have been caused had
the doctor acted reasonably should be deducted from the harm of 5000. This expected harm is
1 x 4000 = 400, and therefore under the PRP the doctor should be liable for 5000 - 400 = 4600.
44. Cf. Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 967-74 (2003) (claim-
ing that the chance of benefit is in itself a benefit).
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To summarize the differences among the ORP, the PRP, and the prepon-
derance of the evidence principle traditionally applied in tort cases, the
Table below compares the outcomes reached by separately applying these
principles to each of four cases. Each case involves an injurer who must
choose between two risky acts, both of which adversely affect a potential
victim. In all four cases, an injurer choosing between Act A and Act B
should choose Act B, whose expected harm is 400, over Act A, whose ex-
pected harm is 500, but the injurer negligently chooses Act A. Case 1 is
typical of the offsetting risk cases discussed throughout this Article and il-
lustrated by Example 1. As explained above, the three principles under
discussion yield different outcomes, and only the ORP makes the injurer
internalize the true social costs of his wrongdoing. Case 2 is about certain
harms, not risks. In this case, all three principles yield the same outcome,
which leads the injurer to internalize the costs of his wrongdoing. The third
and fourth cases are hybrids--certain harm on the one hand, and risk of
harm on the other. In Case 3, the injurer must choose between creating a
certain harm of 400 and an expected harm of 500 (a probability of 1 that a
harm of 5000 will result). He negligently chooses the latter, and the harm of
5000 materializes. Both the PRP and the preponderance of the evidence
principle mandate liability of 4600, while the ORP mandates liability of
1000. Only the latter liability will make the injurer internalize the actual risk
created by his wrongdoing. Case 4 is the reverse scenario of Case 3: the
negligent injurer chooses to create a certain harm of 500 instead of an ex-
pected harm of 400 (a probability of .1 that a harm of 4000 will result). In
this case, both the ORP and the PRP yield liability of 100, which is the li-
ability necessary for the injurer to internalize the exact social costs of his
wrongdoing. The traditional preponderance of the evidence principle, how-
ever, yields liability of 500.
TABLE
Act A Act B Liability under
Harm Harm Preponderance Liability under the Liability under
Case (Probability) (Probability) of the Evidence PRP the ORP
1. Risk-Risk 5000 (.1) 4000 (.1) 5000 4600 1000
2. Harm-Harm 500(1) 400(1) 100 100 100
3. Risk-Harm 5000 (.1) 400 (1) 4600 4600 1000
4. Harm-Risk 500(1) 4000 (.1) 500 100 100
In sum, the ORP is the only rule that consistently achieves accurate in-




IV. THE COSTS OF REFUSING TO APPLY THE
OFFSETTING RISKS PRINCIPLE
Prevailing tort law does not recognize the Offsetting Risks Principle. As
a direct consequence, injurers must pay damages for more than the harms
they negligently create. Moreover, injurers are occasionally required to pay
damages for more than the harms created by their activity, negligent or not,
as illustrated by Example 1. The doctor created a risk of 100, not of 500, in
choosing Treatment A; but tort law currently imposes liability that is five
times higher than what is necessary to make him internalize the true risks of
his activity. But is this necessarily a bad thing? Does excessive liability gen-
erate undesirable outcomes?
In fact, in an ideal world without court error in setting the standard of
care and injurer error in complying with that standard, a negligence rule
leading to liability for more than the actual harm caused would not distort
incentives for precautions. In that ideal world, potential injurers threatened
by excessive liability would never behave negligently and would always
escape liability were harm to occur. Consider, for example, an injurer who
creates a risk of 200 and is subject to a liability five times the amount of the
actual harm if the risk is realized due to his negligence. Assume that invest-
ing 50 in precautions reduces the expected harm from 200 to 100, while
investing an additional dollar in precautions beyond that point reduces the
expected harm by one dollar or less. Under the economic interpretation of
the negligence rule, an injurer is considered negligent when the marginal
costs of his precautions fall short of the marginal reduction in his expected
damages.45 Taking precautions beyond that point would be inefficient. In the
ideal world, the potential injurer would satisfy the standard of care by in-
vesting 50 in precautions and would therefore escape liability if harm were
to occur. The fact that the potential liability is five times greater than the
actual harm caused by his negligence would not affect his behavior.
In our nonideal world, however, courts and injurers often make mis-
takes. In this world, threatening the potential injurer with greater liability
than the harm actually produced by his negligence provides him with the
incentive to take greater precautions than what is efficiently justified. Al-
though he has invested 50 in precautions, the injurer would be well aware
that if a harm does occur, he could bear liability five times greater than the
actual harm that materialized. To avoid that risk-which could be quite
high-he will tend to invest excessively in precautions, far beyond the effi-
cient level.46
45. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 334-35 (4th ed. 2003). Or, in
more popular terms, he must invest in precautions so long as one additional dollar in precautions
will reduce the expected harm by more than one dollar.
46. Note that if liability is for the exact amount of actual harm incurred by the injurer (as-
suming his risk neutrality), he will not invest excessively in precautions; indeed, there is no reason




The problem of excessive liability is exacerbated when the injurer's ex-
pected liability exceeds the expected harm of his activity. If an injurer is
required to pay more in damages than the harm he created through his activ-
ity, he might refrain from engaging in that activity even if its benefits are
greater than its costs. This problem is partially solved when the injurer is
able to shift the extra costs of the tort liability to his potential victims
through the price mechanism, but as we will see shortly, this solution does
not always meet with satisfactory results.
In this Part, I will discuss three negative effects of excessive liability in
cases where offsetting risks are present and the ORP is ignored. To simplify
the discussion, I focus on first-category instances, in particular medical mal-
practice cases represented by Example 1, where the doctor's negligence
increases one risk to the patient and simultaneously decreases another risk
to that same patient. This is a very common occurrence, and adopting the
ORP to deal with such circumstances could eliminate the negative effects of
excessive liability. Among other things, the failure to recognize the ORP
fosters the phenomenon of defensive medicine, which is one of the most
severe side effects of medical malpractice liability.
A. Defensive Medicine
One of the most undesirable outcomes of medical malpractice liability is
defensive medicine.4 ' The threat of tort liability encourages doctors, hospi-
tals, and medical service providers to pursue practices that reduce their
liability risk at the expense of their patients' welfare. Defensive medicine is
a result of externalities. When a doctor must choose between two courses of
action and cannot be sure which one is more reasonable or which one a
court will find reasonable in the event that the patient sues, he will choose
the action that is the least risky for him. This, of course, will not necessarily
be the least risky course of action for the patient. It could pose the least risk
to the doctor simply because if harm ensues from that action, the doctor will
not be held liable for the harm, either in whole or in part. Evidentiary barri-
ers and high litigation costs are some of the most common reasons why
doctors escape liability and why costs are externalized to their patients.
A common example of defensive medicine can be found in obstetrics.
Research shows that cesarean deliveries are performed in the United States
at a much higher than optimal rate. 4s A plausible explanation traces this phe-
47. See Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving into the
Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 111, 114 (2005);
Chandler Gregg, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer?, 70 Mo.
L. REV. 307, 318-19 (2005); Kristie Tappan, Note, Medical-Malpractice Reform: Is Enterprise
Liability or No-Fault a Better Reform?, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2005).
48. Lowering the cesarean rate in the United States has been a goal for the past twenty-five
years. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L INST. HEALTH PUB. No. 82-2067, CESAR-
EAN CHILDBIRTH: REPORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 4 (1981). Cesarean
delivery rates in the United States rose dramatically from 4.5 per 100 births in 1965 to 24.1 per 100
births in 1986. A.R. Localio et al., Relationship between Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Deliv-
ery, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 366, 366 (1993). In response to the growing concerns in the 1980s
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nomenon to defensive medicine. When the doctor chooses vaginal delivery
and harm materializes, he is frequently sued, whereas in the event of a ce-
sarean delivery, the patient rarely sues. Arguably this happens not because
cesarean deliveries never end in harm, but because either the harm is too
minor to justify a legal suit or there is a latent harm with long-term effects
that can hardly be traced back years later to the operation. The result is that
most of the harms caused by cesarean deliveries are externalized to the pa-
tient, while most of the harms caused by vaginal deliveries are internalized
to the doctor.49 Lowering physician liability would decrease defensive medi-
cine, because it would decrease doctors' gains from defensive medicine.
Thus if liability were to stand at zero, the practice of defensive medicine
would drop almost50 to zero. However, although lowering liability below the
social costs of doctors' negligence would decrease the practice of defensive
medicine, it could also be detrimental to precaution-taking. For example, if
liability is lower than the social costs of their negligence, doctors might not
utilize cost-justified tests that decrease patient risks unless they could shift
the costs of the tests to the patients. To ensure efficient incentives, liability
should be set at the level of the social costs of the particular action. Any li-
ability above these social costs would lead to a boost in the practice of
defensive medicine and likely provide doctors with an incentive to take ex-
cessive precautions." Accordingly, applying the ORP would reduce liability
precisely to the point of the social costs of doctors' negligence.52
about the rising cesarean rate, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services established de-
creasing cesarean deliveries as one of the Healthy People Year 2000 objectives. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000 § 14.8 (1990). National efforts to decrease the
cesarean delivery rate now focus on low-risk women as defined in the Healthy People 2010 objec-
tives, aiming for a rate of no more than 15 per 100 births. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2 HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, AT 16-9 (2d ed. 2000), available at http://www.healthypeople.gov/
Document/pdffVolume2/16MICH.pdf.
49. Obstetricians are experiencing an ever-increasing rate of malpractice claims against
them. Roger A. Rosenblatt et al., Why Do Physicians Stop Practicing Obstetrics? The Impact of
Malpractice Claims, 76 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 249 (1990). The frequency of such
claims has increased such that, in 1999, 76.5% of obstetrician-gynecologists surveyed by the
American College for Obstetricians and Gynecologists reported having been sued at least once.
Sarah Domin, Comment, Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone? Women's Access to Healthcare
in Jeopardy: Obstetrics and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 499,
504 (2004). In fact, "fear of being sued if complications arise in a vaginal delivery has contributed to
the rising number of Cesarean sections." Elizabeth Swire Falker, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in
Obstetrics: A Gestalt Approach to Reform, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15 (1997). Studies have
examined the impact of the risk of a malpractice claim on the incidence of cesarean deliveries and
found that a significant relationship exists between the rate of cesarean procedures and malpractice
claim frequency. Michael Daly, Comment, Attacking Defensive Medicine Through the Utilization of
Practice Parameters: Panacea or Placebo for the Health Care Reform Movement?, 16 J. LEGAL
MED. 101. 105 (1995); see also Antonella Vimercati et al., Choice of Cesarean Section and Percep-
tion of Legal Pressure, 28 J. PERINATAL MED. 111, 116 (2000) ("[T]he perception of legal pressure
was directly related to the rate of cesarean section in each unit.").
50. Nonlegal sanctions could also trigger defensive medicine practices. For example, a doc-
tor might tend to choose a course of treatment whose failure would be less discernible to colleagues
and thus free from condemnation by those colleagues.
51. See infra Section IV.B.
52. Theoretically, the practice of defensive medicine could be eliminated through the market
by compensating doctors who must choose the courses of action that poses a greater risk to them.
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To illustrate how adopting the ORP would reduce the practice of defen-
sive medicine, let us return to obstetrics. Suppose that a doctor performs a
vaginal delivery and a harm to the baby materializes. If the court were to
hold the doctor liable for negligently choosing this type of delivery but ap-
ply the ORP, it would reduce his liability to reflect the net risk created by his
negligent choice. This net risk is the difference between the risk created by
the vaginal delivery and the risk that would have been created had the doctor
chosen to deliver the baby by cesarean section. Reducing the doctor's liabil-
ity for negligently choosing vaginal delivery would result in a decrease in
doctors' expected gains from choosing cesarean delivery and a consequent
reduction in the practice of defensive medicine.
B. Overinvestment in Precautions
In the absence of the Offsetting Risks Principle, injurers in general-and
doctors in particular--overinvest in precautions. Consider two types of pre-
cautions doctors can take in cases illustrated by Example 1, where
Treatment A entails a risk of 500 and Treatment B a risk of 400. One type of
precaution consists of the additional measures necessary to administer
Treatment B compared to Treatment A, including additional medical tests
and a longer period of hospitalization. Another type of precaution consists
of the measures necessary to determine the magnitude of the risks entailed
by each treatment, including gathering information about the different risks
and consulting with other doctors.
Let us consider the first type of precaution. In Example 1, it would be
efficient for the doctor to choose Treatment A (a risk of 500) over Treatment
B (a risk of 400) if the marginal cost of administering Treatment B instead
of Treatment A is greater than the accompanying marginal benefit in de-
creased risks.5 ' The doctor, however, anticipates losing 500 in expected
value if he chooses Treatment A and is mistakenly found negligent. There-
fore, he might choose Treatment B even if Treatment A would have been the
efficient choice, because he is uncertain whether he would be able to con-
vince a court, in the event that he chooses Treatment A and harm occurs,
that he was not negligent: the marginal costs associated with choosing
Treatment B would have exceeded its marginal benefits. Indeed, sometimes
Doctors will be compensated through the price paid by their patients, and their bias towards the less
risky course of action will disappear. Market imperfections, however, often preclude such arrange-
ments. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 64-65 (2005) ("[P]hysicians have little
or no ability to raise prices in response to increased costs. When a malpractice insurance crisis hits,
the burden falls disproportionately on physicians in high-risk specialties and locations, who cannot
raise their prices in response."); Michelle M. Mello & Carly N. Kelly, Effects of a Professional
Liability Crisis on Residents'Practice Decisions, 105 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1287, 1293-94
(2005); Peter Eisler et al., Hype Outraces Facts in Malpractice Debate, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2003,
at IA (claiming that the cause of doctors' inability to pass higher costs to patients is the limitations
on reimbursements set by managed care insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid).
53. That is,
CB - CA > rA - rB
where c. and c. are the costs of Treatments A and B, respectively, and r. and r. are their risks.
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the cost difference, in its entirety or in part, is not verifiable in court (such as
investment of time or other nonmonetary efforts), and even when it is verifi-
able, the doctor is well aware that there is always a risk of error on the part
of the court or the doctor himself.5 4 Applying the ORP would prevent these
distortions in incentives for doctors, because the Principle brings the amount
of liability into line with the social costs of the negligent behavior.
The second type of precaution relates to gathering information about the
risks entailed by the two treatments in order to choose the right one. Con-
sider Example I and assume that the costs of administering the two
treatments are the same and that the reasonable choice is the one with lower
risks. The efficient level of investment in gathering information about the
risks is only 50, not 100, because the doctor has a 50% chance of making
the right choice even with no information about the risks of the two treat-
ments. Assuming risk neutrality, investing more than half of the social costs
associated with making the wrong choice is inefficient. But the doctor in
Example 1 would invest more than 50 in gathering information for reasons
similar to those discussed with respect to the first type of precaution. Apply-
ing the ORP would prevent such an overinvestment.
A strict liability rule would also prevent overinvestment in precautions. I
discuss strict liability as an alternative to the ORP below in Section V.D.
C. Overburdening the Negligence-Producing Activity and
the Relevance of a Contractual Relationship
When the injurer is liable for more than the harm his activity causes, he
may decrease that activity or forego it all together, even if it is desirable
54. To understand the distortion in its most extreme form, suppose that Treatment A entails a
risk of 500 and Treatment B entails a risk of 499. This raises the anomaly of a doctor's great will-
ingness to choose Treatment B even if the additional costs necessary to administer that treatment are
much higher than 1. The ORP prevents this anomaly.
55. At first glance, one could mistakenly confuse the argument made in this Article-that
ignoring the ORP burdens injurers with liability for more harm than what they actually caused-
with another argument-that injurers who do not satisfy the standard of care could be liable for
harm that was not caused by their negligence, thereby resulting in overdeterrence. Under the latter
argument, a rule of negligence creates discontinuity or a sudden jump in liability, because the ex-
pected liability of an injurer who satisfies the standard of care drops to zero, while any deviation
from that standard results in full liability for any harm that occurred. This discontinuity and its be-
havioral consequences were originally explained in Robert D. Cooter, Commentary, Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 80-89 (1982), with Cooter later explaining
that the discontinuity is due to incomplete information available to the courts or the probabilistic
nature of the causal connection. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and
How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1989). Mark Grady and Marcel Kahan also have demon-
strated that the discontinuity of liability as well as the risk of burdening the negligent injurer with
liability for more than the harm he caused completely disappear when causation rules are properly
applied so that the injurer is liable only for those harms that would not have been created had he
behaved reasonably. Mark F Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J.
799, 812-13 (1983); Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence
Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427-29 (1989). In contrast, the argument made in this Article for
adopting the ORP holds regardless of the information available to courts or juries and even when the
prevailing causation rules are properly applied: ignoring offsetting risks will result in liability for
much more than the harms negligently caused by injurers.
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from a social perspective. If the actor derives a benefit of 300 from the activ-
ity and the harm amounts to 100, liability of 500 would inefficiently cause
him to cease his activity. Not applying the ORP could have this effect. This
is quite clear with respect to all cases falling within the three categories dis-
cussed in Part 11-where the injurer and the victim are strangers to one
another. The issue becomes more complicated when a contractual relation-
ship exists between the parties, as illustrated by Example 1. Would imposing
liability on doctors, in excess of the harm they cause, inefficiently repress
their activity?
At first glance, the answer to this question seems to be no. The scope of
doctors' liability is irrelevant to the activities they engage in, because one
way or another, doctors could shift their liability costs to patients by increas-
56ing prices. If liability in Example 1 is 500 instead of 100, the patient will
pay more in the price of the service she receives but will be awarded with
more damages if harm occurs. Consequently, both patient and doctor-
assuming they are risk neutral-will be indifferent to the scope of the doc-
tor's liability. This analysis, however, is overly simplistic. As shown earlier,
refraining from reducing liability for the offsetting risks exacerbates defen-
sive medicine and gives doctors an incentive to overinvest in precautions.
These drawbacks, which can seldom be cured contractually, 7 are shouldered
by the patient, with the result that the excessive liability leads to a dimin-
ishment in the overall utility a patient can derive from her doctor's services.
This utility is determined by the quality of the service (which the practice of
defensive medicine decreases), the price the patient pays (which the exces-
sive costs of precaution increases), and the scope of the doctor's liability.
The erosion of the patient's utility from the medical services renders their
consumption suboptimal.5 8
V. CRITICISM AND OBJECTIONS
The central objection to the Offsetting Risks Principle may be that vic-
tims will not be fully compensated for the harms they suffer. Partial
compensation may seem especially troubling when the offsetting risks relate
to a third party or society in general: why should the victim, in effect, have
to pay for the benefits that unrelated parties receive at her expense? Another
possible objection to the ORP is that courts' failure to offset risks often
cures another malfunction plaguing tort law-the underenforcement of legal
norms. There may also be a pragmatic objection to the ORP: its application
requires that courts use costly information, which increases litigation costs.
Finally, one could argue that other mechanisms could cure some or all of the
56. In fact, this assumption does not always hold. See supra note 52.
57. See supra note 52; infra Section V.D.
58. Note that the underlying assumption of the discussion in the text above is that the law




inefficiencies created by courts' failure to offset risks. This Part addresses
each of these objections in turn.
A. Undercompensation of Victims
Applying the ORP naturally leaves victims partially uncompensated for
the harm they suffered due to the injurer's wrongdoing. This outcome can-
not be reconciled with principles of corrective justice, which mandate that
the injurer rectify the injustice he inflicted on his victim by way of compen-
sation.59 The ORP clashes with this principle, because it leads to only partial
rectification of the injustice. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for dis-
missing this concern of undercompensation, in addition to the efficiency
rationale already discussed in this Article.
The first and most important reason is the victim's ex ante interest in ap-
plying the ORP to cases falling in the first category. In the second and third
categories of cases, the victim obviously has an ex ante interest in receiving
the greatest amount of compensation possible, especially when there is no
contractual relationship between the injurer and the victim and when she
bears none of the negative effects of high compensation. The greater com-
pensation would provide the injurer with a stronger incentive to overprotect
the victim's interests, even if at the expense of third parties or society as a
whole.6° The situation is completely different in the first category of cases,
when all interests involved are the victim's interests. The following discus-
sion focuses on medical malpractice cases, as illustrated by Example 1, but
could easily be applied to other cases.
One reason for a patient's ex ante interest in the nonapplication of the
ORP would be her preference for full compensation, even if, as a risk-averse
person, she must pay a premium to acquire that entitlement. The difficulty
with this insurance argument lies in the anomaly it produces. If full compen-
sation is the patient's motive, why should liability be limited only to
negligent medical accidents and not to all harms, regardless of how they
unfolded? Indeed, the risk-averse patient would presumably be willing to
pay a higher premium and receive full coverage in return. Thus the insur-
ance argument cannot justify a rule of negligence (as opposed to strict
liability, which has its own flaws) 6' by the patient's ex ante interest in full
compensation. A much better reason for the victim to prefer a negligence
rule to a no-liability rule would be her interest in optimal deterrence of her
doctor.
59. See WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 19-20.
60. It is possible to conceive of cases falling into the second category where the victim's ex
ante interests are less clear. Take, for instance, the example of the emergency room doctor who must
decide which patient to treat first. See supra text accompanying note 32. A threat of high liability in
the absence of the ORP could encourage the doctor to treat the patient more likely to bring a suit
against him. Applying the ORP will result in lower liability and a decrease in the practice of this
kind of defensive medicine. See supra Section W.A. Patients less inclined to sue the doctor may
prefer such a liability regime.
61. See infra Section V.D.
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Optimal deterrence, as this Article demonstrates, is better achieved un-
der the ORP. In particular, there is no reason for the patient to prefer a rule
that decreases the surplus she can secure from her interaction with her doc-
tor. A rule that rejects the ORP results in precisely this undesirable effect. As
explained above, nonadoption of the ORP leads to more defensive medicine
and overinvestment in precautions, both borne by the patient. Conversely,
adopting the ORP would increase the total surplus the patient would receive
from contracting medical services and would, therefore, be the preferable
62rule from her perspective. It is hard to see how the patient would suffer
injustice under the ORP.
A second reason, rooted in retributive justice, can explain for one set of
cases-those in which the defendant is a recurrent wrongdoer-why the
ORP can be less troubling from a moral perspective. In such instances, the
ORP will make the wrongdoer pay over time no more and no less than the
harm he caused, whereas prevailing tort law currently makes him pay in
excess of this harm. Because justice considerations relate not only to the
victim but also to the injurer, the objection to applying the ORP in these
cases seems less compelling. To illustrate, let us frame Example 1 as a re-
peat scenario: the same doctor frequently undertakes procedures that involve
offsetting risks. Over time, without the ORP, the doctor pays damages far
beyond what he causes to his patients. As explained above,63 if the scenario
presented in Example 1 were to recur ten times, the harm caused by the doc-
tor's negligence (or by his activity, negligent or not) would be 1000, not
5000. Although the ORP leads to the violation of the corrective justice prin-
ciple requiring that the wrongdoer pay full compensation to the victim, it is
at the same time consistent with a retributive justice principle: the injurer
should be liable for the precise amount of the harm he caused.
64
Last, but not least, problems of undercompensation could be solved out-
side the realm of tort law, either by social insurance or by private
65insurance. Recall that many accidents, medical and otherwise, are notcompensated under prevailing tort law. Also recall that in cases illustrated
62. Porat, supra note 19, at 112-16.
63. See supra Part 1.
64. Cf David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 53 (1989) (arguing that retributive justice mandates that criminals be exposed to the same risk
to which they expose their victims); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (applying the same
argument to tort law). It is possible to reconcile the PRP with principles of corrective justice. In
Example I cases, applying the PRP would result in a damages award of 4600 rather than 5000. See
supra Part III. The PRP is reconcilable with principles of corrective justice because the PRP is more
about evidence than substance, and corrective justice is generally indifferent to evidence. Moreover,
the PRP is aimed at overcoming the uncertainty of the specific interaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant, whereas the ORP has a different objective. See supra discussion accompanying note
44. One of the tenets of corrective justice is its focus on the specific interaction between the injurer
and the victim. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 354-60 (1992); WEINRIB, supra note 2,
at 64-66; Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IowA L. REv. 449, 507-14
(1992).
65. The risk that poor people would not be able to purchase insurance is a general problem
that can be solved in our context either through mandatory first-party insurance or social insurance.
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by the first category of cases, including Example 1, the definition of "harm
caused by the doctor," as opposed to "harm caused by nature," is, at the very
best, unclear. A patient who might have been nonnegligently exposed to an
expected harm of 400-but instead was negligently exposed to an expected
harm of 500 which was realized into an actual harm of 5000, and is com-
pensated for that harm-could be considered to have received a windfall.
The reason for that is that, had the doctor nonnegligently exposed her to an
expected harm of 400 and that risk materialized into an actual harm of 4000,
the victim would have remained completely uncompensated!
B. Curing Underenforcement
Underenforcement of the law is a generally pervasive problem, 66 and the
area of provision of medical services provides no exception. Many patients
who suffer harm due to malpractice do not bring suits against their doctor or
67
else fail to succeed in justified actions. When the law is not fully enforced,
wrongdoers do not bear the full social costs associated with their wrongdo-
ings and, as a result, do not take efficient precautions. The nonapplication of
the ORP could mitigate this underenforcement. Thus, if in cases illustrated
by Example 1 (as well as in other examples discussed in this Article), only
20% of such cases end up in court and result in the imposition of liability,
perhaps liability in the amount of the entire harm (and not merely for a
fraction of it as mandated by the ORP) could remedy the problem of under-
enforcement.
This argument is not persuasive. First, it is hard to assess the scope of
underenforcement in the provision of medical services. 61 It is quite possible
that there are many positive externalities present in this field-that is, bene-
fits not captured by prices-that offset the negative externalities arising
from underenforcement. 69 Second, even if underenforcement exists in the
66. But sometimes the problem is overenforcement. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743 (2005) (discussing when overenforcement arises and
how the law of evidence and procedure handles it).
67. See BAKER, supra note 52, 22-44 (arguing that there is a huge underenforcement problem
in medical malpractice, because many patients injured by medical malpractice do not sue).
68. But see id. at 63 (presenting evidence of the magnitude of the underenforcement prob-
lem).
69. David S. Bloch & William Robert Nelson, Jr., Defining "Health": Three Visions and
Their Ramifications, I DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 723, 731 (1997) ("Commentators who consider
health a non-marketable good contend that there are elements of health which, though valuable, are
unquantifiable, such as hope, compassion, and the extension and preservation of life .... Health's
social benefits are not fully realized by the market price it commands.") (footnote omitted); Maja
Campbell-Eaton, Student Article, Antitrust and Certificate of Need: A Doubtful Prognosis, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 1451, 1459 (1984) ("Moreover, health care usually is viewed as a 'merit good,' with benefits
extending beyond its economic value. This view is reinforced by the ethical mandates of the health
professions and by a widespread belief that 'more is better' in the provision of medical services.");
T.R. Marmor et al., Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (1981)
("Improved health, the anticipated outcome of medical care, has positive externalities. This makes
medical care a merit good, and, unlike many other economic goods, one that should not be allocated
solely on the basis of ability to pay."); See also Stuart H. Rome, Medicine and Public Policy: Let Us
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provision of some medical services, the phenomenon is not present in the
provision of others, where offsetting risks may exist. It is difficult to see any
benefit in creating overenforcement by ignoring these risks, simply because
there is underenforcement elsewhere. In particular, there is no reason to as-
sume that the presence of offsetting risks is a good proxy for
underenforcement that can be cured by ignoring offsetting risks altogether.
Finally, even if there is underenforcement in the provision of some medical
services, or in certain other fields where offsetting risks are present, there is
no reason to assume that the extent of the underenforcement and the extent
of the overenforcement created by courts' disregard for offsetting risks are
of similar magnitude. These are two distinct problems that should be dealt
with separately and should not be intertwined.
C. Information and Application
Another possible objection to adopting the ORP is that its application
requires more information for courts (and juries) than the information
needed for damages awards under prevailing tort law. This complicates the
process of awarding damages and raises litigation costs.




This formula accounts for the offsetting risks (r,), the risks that are real-
ized as harm to the victim (rA), and the harm that eventually materialized
(hA). Most of this information is irrelevant-goes the objection-when
courts award damages under prevailing negligence law. Under the prevailing
regime, courts do, indeed, need to measure the harm that materialized, but
they need only to determine whether the injurer was negligent or not: meas-
uring rA and r,, which is crucial to the application of the ORP, is not
necessary under prevailing law.
The requirement of additional information cannot justify rejecting the
ORP for two reasons. First, courts often use the Hand Formula to determine
whether an injurer was negligent or not, comparing the precautions the in-
jurer failed to take and the expected harm that would have been reduced had
those precautions been taken. Expected harm under the Hand Formula is no
more than the difference between the ORP formula's rA and r. It is true that
courts applying the Hand Formula need not accurately measure the expected
harm, because it is sufficient that they determine whether the costs of the
untaken precautions were higher or lower than the expected harm, even
without verifying the exact figures. Still, courts need some information
Look Before We Leap Again, 41 MD. L. REv. 46, 48 (1981) (listing a number of potential benefits of
medical care that possibly escape reflection in market prices).
70. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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about the various risks involved (rA and r,), and the additional information
required to apply the ORP is not necessarily difficult to gather.
Second, and more importantly, the application of the ORP need not be
accurate to its theoretical limits to be an improvement over the prevailing
regime. Even rough estimations of ra and r, are better than nothing at all. In
fact, ignoring offsetting risks across the board is tantamount to assuming
that these risks are always zero. This is most certainly not the case.
It is the task of the legislature to change the law to allow the courts, es-
pecially in medical malpractice cases, to reduce damages when offsetting
risks are present. Courts should have at their disposal a legislated menu of
possibilities from which they can choose, guided by the simple formula set
out in this Article. The legislature could allow courts to award damages, for
example, for 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of the harm. Courts would
then not need exact figures in order to apply the ORP formula and could
make do with rough estimates. Thus aided by a legislative arrangement, the
formula could be easily and effectively applied.7
D. Other Alternatives
The inefficiency resulting from ignoring offsetting risks could arguably
be resolved through mechanisms other than the ORP. In this final Section, I
briefly discuss some of these possible alternatives.
First, instead of adopting the ORP, the law could switch from a negli-
gence rule to a strict liability rule to resolve the inefficiency of the
overinvestment-in-precautions phenomenon described in Section IV.B. Re-
call that under prevailing negligence law, this phenomenon is triggered by
the great disproportion between a doctor's expected liability if he makes the
right choice and his expected liability if he makes the wrong choice. The
ORP reduces the difference between the two and aligns the doctor's liability
with the social costs of his negligence. In Example 1, if the ORP were ap-
plied, the doctor's expected liability for wrongfully choosing Treatment A
would be 100, whereas his expected liability for choosing Treatment B
would be 0. This difference of 100 in the expected liabilities would remain
unchanged if we were to switch to a strict liability standard: the doctor's
expected liability would be 500 for choosing Treatment A and 400 for
choosing Treatment B. Under both the ORP and a strict liability rule, the
doctor in Example 1 would invest in precautions at the efficient level.
Discussing the desirability of switching to a strict liability rule for medi-
cal and other types of accidents is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
important to note, however, that strict liability for medical accidents would
not solve the defensive medicine problem discussed in Section IV.A. In fact,
a rule of strict liability for doctors would further foster the practice of
71. Another issue relating to the courts' lack of information is that, under certain circum-
stances, the ORP encourages potential injurers like doctors to artificially raise the offsetting risks in
order to reduce their liability should harm occur. When such a measure is verifiable, courts can
refrain from offsetting the enhanced risks and deduct only the risks that would have existed even
absent the injurer's artificial production of risks.
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defensive medicine. Under such a rule, doctors presumably would gain more
than what they currently gain under the prevailing negligence rule from
choosing courses of action where it is very hard to trace ensuing harms back
to the medical treatment they administered. Moreover, liability for all harms
suffered by their patients would make doctors liable for far more harms than
those created by their activity, negligent or not. If, in Example 1, the doctor
reasonably chooses Treatment B and a harm of 4000 materializes, making
him bear liability is tantamount to making him his patient's health insurer.
Under such a legal rule, the doctor would be liable for harms resulting from
the patient's preexisting conditions in no way related to the doctor's behav-
ior. Making the doctor his patient's health insurer and expanding his liability
accordingly would produce difficulties that cannot be thoroughly discussed
here.72
A second alternative to adopting the ORP is for the government to sub-
sidize injurers for the positive externalities created by their behavior,
negligent and nonnegligent alike. This solution has one appealing advan-
tage: if it could be implemented, victims would be fully compensated even
in the presence of offsetting risks, while injurers would have efficient incen-
tives. Moreover, it would mitigate another possible problem with the ORP-
under the ORP, those who are credited for positive externalities are those
who negligently inflicted harm, whereas those who did not inflict any harm
get no credit even though they also created positive externalities.
Even putting the political obstacles aside, this alternative is not a practi-
cal option, certainly not in the area of medical malpractice. It could work if,
and only if, ignoring offsetting risks burdened doctors with excessively high
costs, but did not affect their incentives to take precautions. But as illus-
trated in this Article, ignoring offsetting risks distorts the incentives of
doctors by encouraging them to overinvest in precautions and to practice
defensive medicine. As long as the government does not proceed on a case-
by-case basis to fine tune the subsidy to match the positive externalities the
injurer has created, the injurer's incentives will remain suboptimal. For ob-
vious reasons, a case-by-case subsidy is impractical and therefore does not
constitute a satisfactory solution to the problem of offsetting risks.
A third alternative is to leave it to the injurer and victim, like the doctor
and patient, to make the efficient contract they desire instead of imposing
the ORP. This solution is relevant only for those cases in which the injurer
and victim are not strangers and the transaction costs of drafting the contract
between them are not prohibitively high. Note also that the law forbids cer-
tain injurers and victims, including doctors and patients, from opting out of
the prevailing liability regime that fails to take offsetting risks into account.73
72. Since the price patients pay does not capture all benefits created by medical treatments
(positive externalities) and since it is difficult for physicians to raise prices to cover their increased
costs, under strict liability physicians will charge much less than necessary to respond to the broad
liability imposed on them. See supra notes 53, 69.
73. See e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963); Health Net of Cal.,
Inc. v. Dep't of Health Servs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Richard A. Epstein, Con-
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Were this not the case, the proposal to adopt the ORP would have been a
scheme for an efficient default rule, which most parties would be willing to
adopt in their contracts.
A fourth and final alternative is to relax the standard of care when offset-
ting risks are present and impose liability only for gross negligence.
Although this could mitigate some of the negative effects that arise when
offsetting risks are completely ignored, it could hardly serve as a compre-
hensive solution to the problem. Unlike the ORP, it cannot be fine tuned for
14each case, and therefore its impact does not extend to all relevant cases.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that when an injurer's wrongdoing causes harm
to a victim but simultaneously decreases other risks, liability should be re-
duced below full compensation. This holds for all cases in which the
potential injurer must balance his victim's interests and choose the course of
action that is most beneficial to the victim. Many cases of medical malprac-
tice can be classified as such. If this argument is accepted and liability
reduced due to the presence of offsetting risks, the result will be a tremen-
dous and desirable decrease in the damages awarded in medical malpractice
suits. Doctors will be liable for the amount of the social harm created by
their negligence-and no more. The practice of defensive medicine will be
reduced and overinvestment in precautions discouraged, with the main bene-
ficiaries being the patients, who will pay less and receive more in return.
Any problem of undercompensation for patients can, and should, be re-
solved outside the boundaries of tort law. Moreover, the diminishment in
damages awards will save huge amounts of money currently being pocketed
by attorneys in the form of contingent fees.75
Many scholars are suspicious of tort law's ability to efficiently deter
wrongdoers. These scholars maintain that, at least in certain areas, it is bet-
ter to replace tort law with insurance schemes (such as social insurance) in
16order to avoid the high costs entailed by the existing legal regime . The
counterclaim is that even though tort law is far from being ideal, it still• 77
works and has a role to play in deterrence. This Article has sought to show
that optimal deterrence can, indeed, be better achieved: not only would re-
ducing damages due to offsetting risks improve incentives, it would also
reduce the general costs involved in the existing legal regime. Lowering
damages makes the operation of tort law less expensive.
tractual Principle Versus Legislative Fixes: Coming to Closure on the Unending Travails of Medical
Malpractice, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 503, 505-06 (2005).
74. See Porat, supra note 19, at 126-28, 131-35, 138-40.
75. See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COM-
PENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 40, 184 (1989).
76. Id. at 169.
77. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
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The Article proposes a framework that is not limited to medical malprac-
tice cases or even to cases where the injurer balances among conflicting
interests of the victim. As shown, there are many instances in which the po-
tential injurer must balance the victim's interests against the interests of
third parties or society at large. If tort law strives for optimal deterrence-
that is, minimization of social costs-then in all of these cases offsetting
risks should reduce liability. If, however, one accepts that principles of cor-
rective justice and the goal of compensation should play a determinative role
in tort law, and I believe they most certainly do, then cases in which the off-
setting risks relate to third parties or society at large could require different
treatment. In such cases, application of the ORP is far more problematic.
The area in most urgent need of the ORP is medical malpractice. Offset-
ting risks are a very common phenomenon in the provision of medical
services, and liability in some medical fields is excessively high, with pa-
tients typically paying the price of this inflated liability. I propose that the
legislature authorize courts, at least in medical malpractice cases, to reduce
damages when offsetting risks are present. The reduction could be in a
roughly estimated amount, according to a menu of possibilities set by the
legislature from which courts would choose, guided by the simple ORP
formula set out in the Article. Offsetting risks can-and should-be taken
seriously by the law.
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